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In the 1990s the firefighter’s hood became a standard article of safety 
equipment worn by municipal firefighters, eliciting a negative reaction among 
many of these firefighters. I used data from interviews with 42 firefighters to 
explain why this reaction occurred. Data analysis revealed that negative 
reactions ultimately stemmed from the hood’s disruption of autonomy, 
repudiation of the complex mental and physical skill needed to perform tasks 
required of firefighters, and hindrance in negotiating the life-threatening 
environment created by a fire. These findings indicate that when introducing 
new safety equipment technology to emergency response workers, their reaction 
to this equipment, and its effect on their autonomy and ability to complete 
complex occupational tasks, may have important prevention implications. 
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The importance of understanding technological change and its impact on the worker 
has long been established, dating back to Karl Marx’s 1867 seminal work Das Kapital (1976). 
In this study, Marx’s focus on technological change was in understanding the manufacturing 
process, its alienation of the worker, and the workers’ struggle to maintain control over this 
process (Attewell, 1990). After World War II, this argument was updated by contemporary 
claims on the pattern of skill change (see Spenner 1983, 1995; Vallas & Beck, 1996). 
Arguments were made that new technologies would act as a mechanism for increasing the skill 
levels of workers (Blauner, 1964; Kerr, Dunlap, Harbison, & Meyers, 1964). Others then 
followed contradicting these claims (Braverman, 1974), arguing that technology would strip 
workers with as much skill as possible in an effort to increase productivity (Vallas, 1990). 
These studies mainly consisted of antithetical, theoretically-based arguments absent of 
empirical evidence (Spenner, 1983, 1995).  
Over the past few decades, there has been a new focus on the introduction of technology 
in the workplace. With the exponential increase of the adoption of computers and information 
technologies (IT), and availability of new data sources (Ward 2010), many studies now 
examine how IT effects the worker. Similar to earlier work, more recent research has focused 
on the relationship between technology and workers’ skill levels (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 
2002; Bound & Johnson, 1992; Goos & Manning, 2007; Katz & Murphy, 1992; Levy & 
Murnane, 2004; Pianta, 2005; Piva, Santarelli, & Vivarelli, 2005).  
It has also been recognized that before the impact of new IT can affect the skill levels 
of workers and productivity, the workers must accept and use this technology. A multitude of 
conceptual models seeking to understand technology acceptance have been developed and 
empirically tested. The result has been a unified theory of acceptance and use of technology 
(UTAUT) that finds performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and 
facilitating conditions all play a role in whether technology is accepted and subsequently used 
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(Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). While criticisms of the UTAUT do exist (Bagozzi, 
2007), there is agreement that understanding workers’ reactions to new technologies may be 
just as important as understanding how a technology impacts the workers’ themselves. 
Even with this long history of studying the introduction of new technology into the 
workplace, there still remains gaps in our understanding. The majority of previous research 
studies have maintained focus on manufacturing industries or the “white-collar” context of the 
professional office environment. Other industries, specifically those in the public service and 
non-profit sectors, remain understudied. In addition to this gap, there is another regarding the 
type of technologies that recent research has studied. While computers and IT have become the 
main focus of the majority of research on technology and workers’ acceptance/reaction, they 
are not the sole type of technology being introduced. For example, advances in biochemical 
engineering and materials sciences have led to new technologies that now play a direct and/or 
indirect role in many occupations, whether one may realize it or not. Studies focusing on 
occupations that may fill these gaps, such as firefighting, have potential to add further 
understanding to the broader literature.1  
 
Firefighters and New Technology 
 
Research focusing on firefighters has been completely absent from the literature. In 
recent years a handful of studies have examined various aspects of the occupation of 
firefighting, including why individuals (particularly men) become firefighters in spite of the 
life-threatening hazards faced (Desmond, 2006, 2007, 2011), the ergonomics of wearing 
firefighter clothing (Park, Kim, Wu, & Allen, 2014), and firefighter-perceived occupational 
health and safety risks (Walker, 2016). In addition, two other studies have examined the 
introduction of new technologies to firefighting, and the reactions of firefighters to these 
technologies (Ericson & Mellström, 2016; Morris, 2015). 
Ericson and Mellström (2016) examined the association between technology and 
masculinity, how it informs the “occupational ethos of firefighters” (p. 165), and how 
operational services’ micro-management of disasters is gendered. Drawing from a series of 
interviews and research studies conducted with firefighters in the Swedish rescue service, their 
main conclusions discuss the historical celebration of masculinity in firefighting and how it has 
excluded women from this occupation. However, they also note that new technologies 
(particularly those used for fire suppression and search and rescue) have played a notable role. 
The introduction of these technologies has challenged the exclusive nature of firefighting in 
Sweden, and the ability to demonstrate heroism in a traditional sense, which has historically 
been celebrated (Ericson & Mellström, 2016). Thus, while the acceptance and reaction to new 
technology may be viewed in a positive light by some firefighters, for others with a more 
traditional view this perspective may not be shared. 
In the second study, Morris (2015) used the technology acceptance model (one of the 
conceptual models used to inform the UTAUT; Venkatesh et al., 2003) to explicitly examine 
interoperability of communications technologies, and their acceptance by sworn and civilian 
firefighters in a single U.S. fire department. He found that longer tenured, older, and more 
experienced firefighters had lower perceived ease of use of these technologies. In addition, he 
also found that higher ranking and more senior firefighters had a higher perception of the 
usefulness of these technologies (Morris, 2015). These findings show variation in different 
dimensions of technology acceptance by demographic and individual characteristics, but do 
not deduce the rationale behind this acceptance, or perform any in-depth exploration of why 
                                                          
1 This is not to imply that IT and computerization are absent from firefighting. These types of technologies have 
also been introduced, and are many times required to be used by firefighters to perform the tasks required by their 
occupation (Ward, 2010). 
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these associations exist. While both studies have provided a first glance at reaction to new 
technologies in the fire service, there is still much more room for examination. 
The two aforementioned studies focused specifically on the equipment used to actively 
fight fires and communicate while doing so. However, my study examines a component of the 
firefighters’ clothing, or personal protective equipment (PPE). Over the past twenty years the 
PPE worn by firefighters has changed quite drastically; literally from head (a shift from metal 
to non-metal breakaway helmets) to toe (a shift from three-quarter rubber to composite material 
boots). Such innovations often have occurred after rigorous scientific testing, always with an 
ultimate goal of enhancing the safety of firefighters while they are engaged in combating fire. 
Yet even with the PPE’s scientifically-supported increase in personal safety and injury 
prevention among firefighters, a pattern of resistance to some of these safety-driven 
technologies has emerged (e.g., not wearing certain portions of the PPE in compliance with 
standard operating guidelines). One particular article of clothing that has been a prevailing 
source of contention, and is the technology focused upon in my study, is the firefighter’s hood. 
While the negative reaction to the introduction and mandated use of the firefighter’s 
hood is interesting in itself, it also serves as a prime example for the study of the adverse 
reaction to new safety equipment technology among emergency repose workers. Therefore, 
focusing on this technology, I sought to inform the broader question of why adverse reactions 
to the use of prevention-related technologies may exist among emergency response workers. 
Here I use thematic analysis (Boyzatis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006) to draw from raw data 
and reach key themes and an overarching argument as to why this reaction occurs. Through 
this systematic, qualitative data analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with 
professional (i.e., non-volunteer) firefighters at two independent U.S. fire departments, I show 
that such reactions may be better explained by understanding firefighter views on life-
threatening situations, and how the firefighter’s hood affects the skills traditionally used to both 
prevent death and successfully perform complex firefighting tasks. In addition to informing the 
broader body of literature, it is also my hope that the data collection and analyses used are 
presented in a manner to provide insight into performing qualitative studies among firefighters 
and other emergency response workers. 
 
Background of the Firefighter’s Hood 
 
 While understanding the empirical literature on the study of acceptance and reaction to 
new technology is important, I also feel it is important to provide a brief history and description 
of the firefighter’s hood itself. In 1997 the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) issued an 
updated version of NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting 
and Proximity Fire Fighting, which serves as a guideline for clothing that is to be worn by 
firefighters while fighting structure fires.2 Although clothing codes/standards for firefighters 
had previously existed, it was not until this updated standard that the NFPA declared 
firefighters should wear a protective hood underneath their helmet. Prior to this, firefighters 
wore only a helmet and facemask attached to a breathing apparatus that supplies oxygen to the 
firefighter. In combination with the remainder of the PPE, the helmet and facemask prevented 
the majority of the firefighters’ skin in the face, head, and neck region from being exposed to 
flames and the resulting heated atmosphere. Yet even with this rather comprehensive clothing 
                                                          
2 The NFPA is a nonprofit organization that began in 1896. Its mission is to reduce the burden of fire on quality 
of life through consensus standards (or codes), research, training, and education (NFPA, 2010). Fire departments 
in the United States are not required to follow these NFPA standards; however, many departments across the 
United States do use them as guidelines. The NFPA 1971 is one of over 300 NFPA standards (NFPA, 2010). The 
number 1971 does not refer to a particular year, but rather an identification number for this specific standard 
assigned by the NFPA. 
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ensemble, firefighters were not fully encapsulated: skin area on their face, ears, and neck was 
still exposed. This changed with the introduction of the firefighter’s hood. When worn in 
combination with the helmet, facemask, and remainder of the PPE, the hood allowed a 
firefighter’s head, face, and neck region to now be completely covered. This left firefighters 
fully encapsulated in their PPE ensemble, which (when worn properly) leaves no areas of skin 
exposed to flame or heated environment. 
 The hood itself fits over and around the firefighter’s head. Attached to the main portion 
of the hood is a bib that is able to be tucked into the firefighter’s PPE coat. The main portion 
of the hood is then pulled up and over the firefighter’s head, leaving an opening for the 
firefighter’s face. A facemask is then worn over the exposed facial area, and the opening in the 
front of the hood is placed around this facemask to create a seal. A helmet is then worn by the 
firefighter over the top of the hood. The firefighter’s hood itself is created using a flame 
resistant, synthetic cloth material referred to as Nomex. Often hoods may be constructed using 
double layers of Nomex material (Prezant, Malley, Barker, Guerth, & Kelly, 2001a) with the 
material being cut in such a way that minimal knitting is needed to construct the hood. The 
hood’s construction allows water from either one’s own perspiration or a fire hose to be 
released. The ability to release water/steam from the hood is an extremely important feature as 
water trapped inside can evaporate and cause a firefighter to suffer steam burns from within 
his/her PPE ensemble. 
 The call for a standard implementation of these hoods was done after testing conducted 
by the NFPA (1997) provided support that the firefighter’s hood enhanced fireground safety 
and protected firefighters from burns to previously exposed areas on the head and neck. The 
findings of this testing have since been replicated by additional research that examined the 
protection provided by the hood to firefighters in New York City (Prezant et al., 2001a, 2001b). 
Through both laboratory and field testing, Prezant and colleagues found dramatic reductions in 
head burns among firefighters who wore a hood. Laboratory testing showed significant 
decreases in burns among the left and right ears, front and back of the neck, and total head 
burns. The field testing supported this finding and showed the use of hoods led to significant 
decreases in ear burns (60%), neck burns (54%), and total head burns (46%). As the NFPA’s 
research did not test instances where the firefighter’s hood was wet, Prezant et al. built upon 
previous research by accounting for this limitation. Their results indicated that the same 
protective effects of a dry hood were present when a firefighter was wearing a hood that was 
either damp or saturated with water (Prezant et al., 2001a, 2001b). 
 Thus, both laboratory and field testing have uniformly produced scientific evidence that 
shows when fighting fire, the proper use of the hood significantly increases protection from 
burns to a firefighter’s head, ears, and neck. Yet even with such strong evidence, more than a 
decade and a half after the NFPA (1997) published its revised 1971 standard the firefighter’s 
hood remains a point of contention among a number of firefighters who are mandated to wear 
it. This raises the question of why do firefighters continue to have negative views on the 
mandated use of the firefighter’s hood? To answer this research question, I collected and 
empirically analyzed data from semi-structured interviews. Here I present the results of this 
analysis, and follow with a discussion of the implications these findings have for understanding 
why adverse reactions to the use of certain safety equipment technologies may exist.3 
                                                          
3 It is useful to provide some information on my background and position for insight as to how these may have 
shaped this current research (Malterud, 2001). This current study on the firefighter’s hood resulted from my larger 
dissertation study conducted that examined changes in skill used to perform job tasks among professional 
firefighters, and how technology has (or has not) impacted this change (Ward, 2010). The occupation of firefighter 
was chosen for this larger study for two reasons. First, as most previous work has examined changes in skill in 
either manufacturing or “white-collar” occupations, a study of firefighters allowed for skill change to be examined 
in a different industry (i.e., public service). Second, I have always had a personal interest in the public service 
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Methods 
 
Context and Sample 
 
 The data I collected for this research included 42 semi-structured interviews of 
professional firefighters (Ward, 2010). The firefighters interviewed were employed at one of 
two independent fire departments located in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States: the 
Waterville City Fire Department (WCFD) or the River City Fire Department (RCFD).4 I 
conducted interviews at these two departments as the RCFD was comprised of only 
professional firefighters, and the WCFD had only a limited number of volunteers, which 
allowed for adequate samples of professional firefighters to be drawn at each of these 
departments. The WCFD and RCFD were urban fire departments founded in their non-
volunteer form in 1895 and 1859, respectively. The WCFD served an area of roughly 37,000 
residents and consisted of 17,000 housing units (approximately 7% of which were vacant; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009). On the other hand, the RCFD was responsible for over 631,000 city 
residents who resided in approximately 296,000 housing units. Compared to Waterville City 
(7%) and the national-level (12%), there was a much larger percentage (20%) of vacant units 
in River City (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). 
Although differences existed between Waterville City and River City, they both shared 
certain similarities with other historic cities throughout the United States. Waterville City 
initially served as a major railroad hub during the U.S. expansion, and grew to a modest size 
that has remained in the present day. Further development has occurred within the city’s 
borders, but it has maintained its original downtown area. River City is a large urban area with 
a shipping port and was a major manufacturing city during the U.S. industrialization period. 
However, as with other U.S. cities that developed during this period, post-industrialization 
caused many employment opportunities within River City to move outside its borders 
subsequently increasing the overall poverty levels. More recently large pockets of 
gentrification have sprung up throughout River City creating a polarization of the 
socioeconomic status among its residents. 
 Both Waterville City and River City fire departments had different organizational 
structures. The WCFD was composed of six fire stations that housed a number of vehicles, or 
apparatuses: five fire engines (containing the pump, hoses, and water) and two fire trucks 
(containing ladders and tools for forcible entry). One of these stations also housed a utility 
vehicle that responded to emergency incidents. Working at these fire stations and on these 
WCFD apparatuses were approximately 80 professional firefighters and 20-25 active volunteer 
firefighters. The WCFD consisted of three shifts of firefighters, each shift working 24-hours 
followed by 48-hours of time off. During each shift, all fire engines and trucks were operated 
by at least two professional firefighters. All three shifts were overseen by the WCFD Fire Chief 
and Deputy Chief. Each of the three shifts had its own battalion chief and captain who directly 
managed and oversaw the day-to-day activities, including all firefighters currently serving on 
that shift. In addition to these firefighters and their commanding officers, the WCFD also had 
a handful of personnel who worked in administrative or fire prevention education positions. 
The RCFD had 41 fire stations, 39 of which housed a total of 36 engines, 18 trucks, 24 
emergency medical service (EMS) units, and a variety of specialty units including 
special/heavy rescue, hazardous materials, fire boats, aerial rescue, and mobile command units. 
                                                          
industry/sector, and as such have met or have relationships with a number of individuals who work in this 
industry/sector. Through these relationships, I had key contacts at the WCFD and RCFD that allowed me contact 
firefighters with whom I could conduct the needed interviews. 
4 Names of the fire departments and firefighters in this study were changed to maintain confidentiality. 
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The RCFD had approximately 1,700 professional firefighters and no active volunteers. The 
RCFD had four different shifts, and the firefighters in this department all worked an eight-day 
rotating schedule. This schedule consisted of two 10-hour days, followed by two 14-hour 
nights, and then four days off. The organizational structure was rather extensive in the RCFD. 
The Department was led by a Fire Chief who oversaw two assistant fire chiefs. One Assistant 
Chief managed the operations, including four shift commanders and the EMS Deputy Chief. 
The other Assistant Chief oversaw five different deputy chiefs, including chiefs for the training 
academy, community relations, information technology support, logistics, and other support 
services. For each shift, there were five battalion commanders each overseeing a different 
geographical region of River City. The various fire engines and trucks were dispersed 
throughout each battalion and (depending on the shift) were each headed by either a captain or 
lieutenant and stationed by three additional firefighters. Each EMS vehicle was operated by 
two firefighters, at least one trained as a paramedic. As with the WCFD, the RCFD also had a 
number of personnel who performed administrative and support staff roles. 
My final sample for this study consisted of 20 firefighters from the WCFD and 22 
firefighters from the RCFD. Of the 20 WCFD respondents, 18 were regular professional 
firefighters, one was a battalion chief, and one was the officer/director of fire prevention 
services. All 20 of these individuals were white males, and ranged in age from their early 20’s 
to mid 50’s. Out of the 22 respondents from the RCFD, 18 were regular professional firefighters 
(three were captains and three were lieutenants). The remaining four respondents included a 
deputy chief, two captains who served under the fire investigation branch, and one firefighter 
who retired from the RCFD just two months prior to being interviewed. Seventeen of these 
RCFD interviewees were white males, four were black males, and one was a black female. The 
age range of those interviewed at the RCFD was from the late 20’s to the early 60’s. 
 
Data Collection Procedures and Analysis 
 
Prior to data collection for this research, I secured approval from the University of 
Maryland’s Institutional Review Board. I collected all data through semi-structured interviews. 
For this particular study, conducting interviews had a clear benefit over other methods. This 
technique allowed the interviewee the opportunity to provide a rich, detailed description of the 
use of safety equipment and other technologies within the fire department, his/her specific 
reactions to these technologies, and the reasoning behind these reactions. As the data I collected 
focused on technologies that were primarily used by firefighters during emergency situations, 
data collection through observations was not realistic. Prior to conducting these interviews, 
both the WCFD and RCFD fire chiefs each granted permission for these interviews to be 
conducted at the fire stations. Each interview was conducted at the specific WCFD or RCFD 
fire station at which the interviewee was currently stationed during his/her given shift. The 
reason behind conducting interviews at the interviewee’s fire station during his/her shift was 
that it required less effort and time on the interviewee’s part as they were already scheduled to 
be at a particular station on a particular day. In addition to easing the burden on interviewees, 
this also made it easier to use a snowball sampling technique to identify additional firefighters 
who may have been willing to participate in this study. 
I conducted all interviews for this research between November 2008 and June 2009. 
Although data are approximately eight years old, they remain relevant the firefighter’s hood 
continues to be worn as part of a firefighter’s PPE. Through two different key contacts, data 
collection was able to be arranged. Prior to interviewing, I conducted site visits at both fire 
departments allowing me to introduce myself to a number of firefighters, spend time with them 
to informally discuss my research, observe some of the daily procedures that occurred at the 
fire stations, begin to coordinate with my key contacts as to how I should proceed with 
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conducting interviews, and ultimately build rapport with members of the two different 
departments.  
Both the WCFD and RCFD interview samples were drawn in a similar manner using a 
combination of two different approaches. First, the key contacts helped organize initial 
interviews with firefighters from each department. After conducting these initial interviews, a 
snowball sampling method (see Handcock & Gile, 2011; Suri, 2011) was used where the 
interviewees were asked if they knew any other firefighters who may be willing to participate 
in an interview. If an interview was arranged using this method, this snowball sampling process 
was attempted to be continued with the next firefighter. During this process interviews at each 
department were also being arranged through the key contacts. In the end, the snowball 
sampling technique proved more effective for drawing a sample at the RCFD, while more 
interviews at the WCFD were arranged through the key informant. The different sizes of the 
two fire departments were the reason for this difference. Relative to the WCFD, the RCFD had 
a larger number of firefighters actively working, and a larger density of firefighters at any given 
fire station that more easily facilitated the snowball sampling technique. 
The majority of firefighters were interviewed while on duty, where at any time an 
interview could be disrupted by an emergency call. These occurrences were not frequent; 
however, when they occurred the interviews were placed on hold while the firefighter 
responded to the call. In all instances except one these interviews were continued later. As the 
firefighters interviewed were all familiar with these emergency responses, these disruptions 
did not appear to have any apparent negative impacts on the interviews. 
During the interviews I utilized a semi-structured questionnaire that not only provided 
flexibility during the aforementioned interruptions, but also allowed the firefighters freedom 
to discuss certain technologies in detailed manner. I developed the questionnaire based on a 
review of literature (i.e., general trade journals, manuals, written standards, and also specific 
written histories of the WCFD and RCFD), and observations from two site visits (one each to 
WCFD and RCFD). After these site visits, a few pre-testing interviews were conducted to 
further refine the instrument (Ward, 2010). A full copy of the questionnaire can be found 
elsewhere (Ward, 2010, Appendix A). The length of the interviews was variable, but the 
average duration of interviews was between 60-75 minutes. 
Once completed, I transcribed each interview within one week (or less) of it being 
conducted (no other persons were used for any part of the transcriptions). After all 42 
interviews had been transcribed, I analyzed the interview data using a general thematic analysis 
approach (Boyzatis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). To begin the data analysis, all interview 
transcripts were read to identify data that related to the research question: why do adverse 
reactions to prevention-related technologies – specifically the firefighter’s hood – exist among 
emergency response workers? In this step of the analysis, open codes were assigned and used 
to identify specific categories. These categories were then organized into three larger themes: 
life-threatening situations, effects on skill, and perceived benefits. The next step of the analysis 
was axial coding, where each theme was developed and examined in relation to one another. 
Finally, through the process of selective coding, the theme of perceived effects on skill was 






The first major theme uncovered was firefighters’ concern over the hood’s effect on 
negotiating the potentially life-threatening environment created by a structure fire. It was not 
the hood’s relation to minor/moderate injuries or burns that were of concern to these 
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interviewees, as the firefighters recognized that when they entered a building that was engulfed 
in flames, the occasional injury or burn does occur. Rather it was the hood’s relation to 
potentially life-threatening injuries or burns that worried these firefighters. The firefighters 
interviewed uniformly agreed that the ability to detect if an environment was life-threatening 
must be learned, such that the firefighter can protect both himself/herself and his/her fellow 
firefighters.  
When the need for this skill was discussed, the interviewees often related it with the 
mandated use of the firefighter’s hood. In these instances, the hood – a piece of equipment that 
functions with a sole purpose of enhancing safety and preventing injury among firefighters – 
was viewed as potentially detrimental to one’s ability to negotiate a burning structure and 
identify areas posing a high likelihood of major injury. A number of firefighters interviewed 
claimed that with the hood now covering the last remaining exposed areas of skin (i.e., face, 
neck, and ears), a firefighter was more prone to placing himself/herself in life-threatening 
situations than when not using the hood at all. As stated by Joshua, a firefighter at the WCFD: 
 
You’re better protected, but at the same time you’re killing more firefighters 
because they’re going deeper into the fire where maybe they shouldn’t be 
because of those places [exposed skin] that weren’t protected in the past. If you 
started feeling really hot and getting burnt, you knew it was time to get out. 
 
This view is somewhat surprising given that previous scientific testing has found support for 
the hood’s prevention of burns (Prezant et al., 2001a, 2001b). However, reflecting back to those 
studies, one can see their incompatibility with the findings of the present study. The focus of 
these past laboratory and field tests was on the effectiveness of the hood at preventing burns, 
not necessarily preventing major injuries and death. To further explore this claim by the 
firefighters interviewed, annual counts of both fireground deaths of firefighters (Fahy, 
LeBlanc, & Molis, 2009) and the occurrence of structure fires (Karter, 2009) in the United 
States can be used (both compiled by the NFPA). Using these data, rates can be created for the 
number of fireground deaths by the number of structure fires both preceding and following the 
year the NFPA recommended the use of the hood. If firefighters’ accounts in the present study 
are valid, one would expect to find no decrease in the rate of firefighter fireground deaths after 
the NFPA standard was published.  
In years following the implementation of the NFPA 1971 Standard there was an overall 
decrease in the fireground death rate (Table 1), it is rather small (a decrease of only 0.22 deaths 
per 100,000 structure fires). From 1986-2008 the death rate tends to fluctuate every few years, 
but the overall rate remains around seven deaths per 100,000 structure fires. In sum, these rates 
do not show a substantial decrease in fireground deaths since 1997 (when the NFPA 
implemented its Standard), and provide no strong evidence that refutes the concern over 
negotiating potentially life-threatening injuries that was raised by a number of the WCFD and 
RCFD firefighters interviewed. 
 
Table 1. Firefighter Deaths at Fireground and Number of Structure Fires, United States 1986-2008 
 
Year(s) Fireground Deaths a Structure Fires b Rate (per 100,000) 
Individual Years    
1986   48      800,000   6.00 
1987   54      758,000   7.12 
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1988   65      745,000   8.72 
1989   59      688,000   8.58 
1990   48      624,000   7.69 
1991   53      640,500   8.27 
1992   38      637,500   5.96 
1993   34      621,500   5.47 
1994   61      614,000   9.93 
1995   42      573,500   7.32 
1996   32      578,500   5.53 
1997 c   41      552,000   7.43 
1998   40      517,500   7.73 
1999   56      523,000 10.71 
2000   39      505,500   7.72 
2001   38 d      521,500   7.29 
2002   46      519,000   8.86 
2003   29      519,500   5.58 
2004   30      526,000   5.70 
2005   25      511,000   4.89 
2006   38      524,000   7.25 
2007   36      530,500   6.79 
2008   29      515,000   5.63 
    
Combined Years    
1986-1996 534   7,280,500   7.33 
1998-2008 406   5,712,000   7.11 
Total (1986-2008) 981 13,545,000   7.24 
a Data source: Fahy et al. (2009). 
b Data source: Karter (2009). 
c Year that the NFPA (1997) published the NFPA 1971 Standard. 
d To maintain consistency with NFPA data reporting, this number does not include the 340 
fireground deaths that occurred at the World Trade Center during the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Effects on Skill 
 
The second theme discovered in the analysis provided an underlying explanation as to 
exactly why the hood, and not external factors or other components of the PPE, was targeted 
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as the culprit in allowing these situations to occur. Ultimately the firefighters’ contention was 
not directed at this safety equipment technology itself, but instead at how the hood removed 
certain skills that the firefighters used on a regular basis to perform the tasks required by their 
occupation. 
More specifically, the interviewed firefighters discussed that the exposed skin areas 
now covered by the hood had traditionally played a critical role in the determination of whether 
or not an environment was too dangerous to enter or remain in while fighting a fire. André, a 
firefighter in the RCFD, summed this by stating: 
 
One thing I’ve noticed though since we’re more encapsulated with all the 
turnout gear [PPE], I’m finding we’re going further in these buildings and 
sometimes getting in spots that we shouldn’t be in. Years ago, you would use 
your ears. When your ears start burning it was time to back up. But now since 
your ears are covered I think we’re going in a little further than we should… So 
yeah, it’s good if somebody is trapped, we need to make a rescue, it’s good to 
have all this on but other times I think we’re going in a little too far sometimes… 
And now especially with the new generation of firefighter we don’t have a lot 
of experience, so they’re not seeing things and, you know, we’re pretty fortunate 
so far, nobody really getting seriously hurt, but, uh, I think the new equipment’s 
kind of made things a little more dangerous really. I kind of used to like use my 
ears and say, “Hey, it’s getting hot in here. Let’s back up and regroup.” 
 
As André discussed, using one’s ears in a certain manner was a skill held by firefighters that 
helped prevent them from entering life-threatening situations. The heat experienced on one’s 
ears would signify when the physical environment was unbearable, in essence placing a 
biological limit on the firefighter’s body as to what heated environments s/he could withstand. 
The feeling of heat to the ear would allow the individual to initiate a mental process that 
informed a decision regarding one’s own personal safety. In fact, during a full-fledged fire 
where a building was fully involved, this sense of touch to the ear may have been one of the 
only senses readily available to firefighters. Sight may often be hindered by the presence of 
smoke. The breathing apparatus worn by firefighters to supply oxygen helped camouflage 
smell and taste, and using sound to gauge the level of danger present may be difficult, especially 
in the midst of a large fire with numerous tasks being performed by various firefighters. Thus, 
with the potential for these four senses to be compromised, the ability to feel heat via one’s ear 
may be the only sense readily available to firefighters. Using this sense was seen by a number 
of firefighters as a true occupational skill that was valuable in preventing both themselves and 
others from entering and remaining in potentially life-threatening situations. 
The identification of heat levels via exposed skin initially may be thought of more as a 
biological reaction than skill, as it is an individual’s human nature to shy away from exposure 
to extreme heat. In fact, acknowledgement of this initial reactionary response did arise in the 
interviews. Peter from the RCFD stated it best by claiming that it is simply “unnatural” to 
purposely move closer and closer to the source of a fire and into an increasingly dangerous 
environment. However, firefighters needed to learn and understand how to negotiate this 
reaction so that they can differentiate between identifying when an environment was unnatural, 
and when it was unnatural and potentially life-threatening. This skill, until the mandated use 
of the firefighter’s hood was learned and used by sensing heat on the exposed skin of one’s 
ears. When this skin was exposed firefighters could internally negotiate the benefits of pushing 
forward to extinguish a fire or perform a rescue in a specific environment relative to the risk of 
major injury or death posed by this same environment.  
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Although recognizing heated environments using exposed skin may not appear 
difficult, the mental and physical processes involved were actually rather complex. A strong 
understanding had to be developed of one’s biological limits, the dangers of the changing 
environment surrounding oneself, and the relation of these to one another. As Carlson from the 
RCFD stated: 
 
Back when I first came in you always left your ears exposed so when you 
crawled down the hall, you know, depending on how hot it was, your ears were 
always telling you… If the place wasn’t being ventilated properly, you knew it 
because; of course you get close to the ground where it was a little cooler and 
as soon as you pick your head up, you could tell how hot it was. And when your 
ears start tingling you know that the truck company is not ventilating the place, 
so back up a little bit. Right now you’re so well protected that you feel nothing. 
We’ve had people, their helmets, they just absolutely melt. And they can stay 
there because they’re so well protected – which is bad… You know [Laughs], 
it’s good that you’re protected that well, but it’s bad because now you’re in an 
environment where if something happens to your mask, you’re dead. 
 
With the mandated use of the hood at both the WCFD and RCFD, and the subsequent covering 
of one’s exposed ears, detecting a super-heated, life-threatening environment could no longer 
be performed in the traditional manner. This took a certain level of autonomy and control away 
from the firefighter and left him/her in the undesirable position of being reliant on the 
technology itself to remain in an environment, without always be certain if that environment 
was life-threatening.  
With this loss of autonomy in identifying life-threatening situations, it may be difficult 
for the firefighters to maintain these skills (see Attewall, 1990).  In fact, the hesitancy and 
resistance to the use of the firefighter’s hood among firefighters shows the recognition of this 
loss of autonomy/control. As discussed in an interview by RFCD firefighter Chad: 
 
But the thing is, when you have a chief outside, or any officer telling you to go 
somewhere, when your ears are telling you you can’t go there ‘cause it’s too 
damn hot, the environment will not allow it. Wearing that hood takes that power 
away from the guy on that pipe [fire hose]. Or that man looking for; doing search 
and rescue. 
 
It is true there are other methods of making the types of decisions Chad describes (e.g., 
interpreting the type of smoke being produced by the fire); however, it was not the dominant 
manner in which firefighters traditionally exerted control over the situation and maintained a 
connection to the environment. This loss of control was an extremely important concern for 
firefighters, and appeared to be a primary culprit of the adverse reaction that firefighters had 
towards the mandated use of the hood. 
In response to this loss, a few firefighters interviewed described actions they took in 
response to the mandated use of the hood. A firefighter named Ryan at the WCFD described 
his solution to the hood’s negation of this autonomy:  
 
The thing that I’ve done and take a beating over is I won’t wear my hood the 
whole way. I’ll keep an ear open. And the reason being is because I don’t feel 
the heat in my gear. And it’s gotten people into trouble as well. They go in too 
deep, they don’t feel anything, they feel okay, and then it’s like “Oh! Whoa, 
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whoa, whoa – hold on!” You know, and by the time they feel it, it’s way too 
bad. 
 
This example shows that Ryan (and a few of the other firefighters) still wore the hood, but 
made alterations in how it (or other components of the PPE ensemble) were worn. Although 
the mandate may include procedures on how the hood is to be worn, Ryan shows that 
firefighters may not be following this mandate verbatim (for another example of such behavior, 
see findings by Weinschenk, Ezekoye, & Nicks, 2008). This action was in no way taken with 
a goal of resisting authority, but instead was used as a mechanism to retain control of the skill 
involved with negotiating if a particular environment is life-threatening. Such alterations of 
one’s PPE ensemble allowed for the ability to still use the sense of touch to assess an 
environment while not completely disregarding the mandated use of the hood. 
The amount of control maintained in identifying and negotiating potentially life-
threatening environments was not the only reason for holding adverse reactions to the 
firefighter’s hood. Many firefighters interviewed also saw this safety equipment affecting the 
complexity involved the process of successfully performing search/rescue or fire suppression, 
a task requiring the integration of numerous mental and manipulative tasks. To perform this 
skill the firefighters must first proceed (sometimes blindly) through a smoke-filled 
environment towards a fire that may be potentially unseen due to a combination of smoke and 
the interior design/layout of the structure. Next, a systematic method must be used such that 
firefighters are familiar with their environment in case the incident of a backdraft or flashover5 
arises and a rapid exit is needed. As there is often a number of firefighters each performing a 
specific task (e.g., search and rescue for victims, spraying water using a hose, ventilation of the 
building, etc.), open communication must be maintained throughout this entire process. During 
each of these steps, the firefighters must each have sufficient physical strength to wear the PPE 
(including an air supply canister), and use some specific tool (e.g., axe, fire hose, etc.) to 
complete physically challenging tasks, such as spraying water onto the fire with a hose or 
forcing entry into a blocked portion of the structure. Throughout this entire process, an ongoing 
negotiation of whether the danger present in the environment has breached one’s biological 
limitations and become life-threatening must also simultaneously occur. 
Clearly the elements involved in performing this skill are rather high. A few WCFD 
and RCFD firefighters I interviewed even jokingly stated that the effort and skill a firefighter 
exerts while going through this process a single time is more than many persons exert at their 
job throughout an entire week’s worth of work. During the interviews, two types of instances 
were given where the use of the hood was also viewed by a number of firefighters as disrupting 
the complexity involved in this process. The first involved disruption in the actual process of 
finding a fire. Prior entering a life-threatening environment, a firefighter had to physically 
arrive at the location. In certain situations, particularly when a fire had not yet developed to a 
large magnitude, the touch of heat to exposed skin was vital in navigating oneself to the area 
of a structure containing the fire. As stated by Tim from the RCFD: 
 
                                                          
5 Backdrafts and flashovers were both extremely dangerous situations that would have detrimental consequences 
for firefighters caught in their wake. A backdraft is an instance where a fire burning in an airtight room depletes 
all the oxygen in that room. The heat and fuel still remain in this room, and the instance that the room’s airtight 
seal is broken and oxygen is introduced back into that environment, an explosive flame results. A flashover is an 
instance when a room may have oxygen and a small fire burning, but lacks the heat required to reach an ignition 
temperature. In this instance, heat can continually build from the small fire in the room, or elsewhere in a structure 
via gases produced by the fire. This process increases heat throughout the entire room until the room reaches a 
certain ignition temperature. The result is an instantaneous flame that engulfs the room and its contents. 
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When you’re in there, and trying (sic) a lot of these buildings, they’re long. 
They’re deep. When you’re going in there and even some of these big frames 
that are like that. It’s, it’s almost impossible to know what direction that fire’s 
in. When I came in, your ears told you that. So if I walk through the door and 
I’m feeling the heat on this side, I’m going to start crawling that way. And then 
I might feel the heat on this side and I might start crawling that way. And that’s 
how you work that way. 
 
As Tim mentions, before a firefighter could even worry about the potential for danger at a 
location, s/he first needed the ability to arrive at the location. The use of one’s exposed ears 
would help facilitate finding the fire itself through feeling and mentally processing heat 
exposure to one’s body, then physically moving in that direction. However, as the firefighter’s 
hood covered the last portion of skin exposed to the environment, this traditional process of 
locating fire was disrupted. 
A second instance where the complexity needed was hindered by the firefighter’s hood 
was in the ability to mentally process if and when an environment became too dangerous, and 
when a firefighter should pull himself/herself out. An example of this was provided by a RCFD 
firefighter named Marvin: 
 
When I came in your ears were burning (sic), your body will not allow you to 
keep going, number one. Number two, you’ll be pushed to the ground. If you 
haven’t found it [the fire] by then, it’s time to go. The only time that you might 
push past that, and you’re not going to get very far, is if you know there’s 
somebody in there. And you’re trying to get to them. That’s a whole different 
ballgame, because adrenaline is taking over. But when that isn’t a factor, and 
this; you’re basically in a shithole that doesn’t mean anything to anybody, it’s 
not worth it. But you cannot make that decision when you have that hood on. 
 
Comprehending one’s biological limits plays an important role in understanding how long a 
firefighter knows s/he can sustain himself/herself in a particular environment. Yet other factors 
add to the complexity involved. For example, firefighters must also mentally process if the 
possibility of a trapped victim exists, and when the ability to perform this rescue is possible 
(even if one’s body is telling him/her otherwise). All of these mental aspects were enabled by 
the exposure of one’s ears to the environment; now to some extent hindered by the use of the 
hood. Thus, it becomes clear that the removal of the autonomy used to negotiate the 
environment created by a fire is not a complete explanation of why certain firefighters hold a 
negative view of the hood, but that to fully understand this adverse reaction the complexity 




A number of firefighters interviewed had an adverse reaction to the mandated use of 
the hood due to its effects on the autonomy and complexity involved in performing 
search/rescue and fire suppression while negotiating the potentially life-threatening 
environment created by a fire. However, it is important to note that not all views of this safety 
clothing were negative. A third theme found through the data analysis showed that there were 
also perceived benefits of using the firefighter’s hood, specifically through intervention (not 
prevention) of a life-threatening situation. This was not a dominant view held by firefighters, 
but it was still a prevalent theme that appeared in the analysis. 
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This recognition was made explicit by a handful of firefighters I interviewed, many (but 
not all) of whom were less experienced and had not begun their firefighting career until after 
1997 when the NFPA Standard was updated. As Donovan, a RCFD firefighter, saw it: 
 
But, you know, the older school mentality was you know, if you got in there 
and the thing started to heat up too much you could feel it. Now you can’t really 
feel it when you wear that hood. It’s almost like you don’t feel it until it’s really 
biting you and then it’s almost like, “Uh oh.” You know, you got to get out. But 
on the other hand, if it did flashover you’d have a better chance of survival if 
you had it on compared if you didn’t have it on. 
 
While the firefighters’ adverse reactions to the hood were in regards to the levels of control 
and complexity that were lost over the prevention of a potentially deadly situation, some 
firefighters interviewed did recognize the hood offered protection during the intervention of a 
backdraft, flashover, or other life-threatening situation. Although the hood removed the initial 
skill involved in this situation, in the instance that a firefighter’s situation took a turn for the 
worse this technology was seen as helpful. Firefighters were now fully encapsulated with the 
hood, and during the instance that a flashover or backdraft occurred, the firefighter’s hood 
provided extra protection that increased the time a firefighter had to exit that particular 
environment. Independent of the decision-making and mental/physical processes used to enter 
or remain in such an environment, firefighters did recognize that the hood (and other PPE 
components) increased their safety if they were already located within a life-threatening 
environment. During these situations the need for the initial decision-making and complexity 
had passed, and the firefighter’s hood was viewed in a positive light as it provided increased 






Through a study of firefighter’s hood, I sought to inform the broader question of why 
adverse reactions to the use of prevention-related technologies exist among emergency 
response workers. Through a systematic, qualitative data analysis of semi-structured interviews 
conducted with professional firefighters, I identified three themes. The first theme was that 
firefighters saw the hood as having an adverse effect on their ability to recognize and negotiate 
whether an environment was life-threatening. The use of this safety equipment covered the last 
remaining area of exposed skin on their bodies, which traditionally was used to identify the 
danger in a given environment. Analysis revealed that the firefighters’ concerns of danger were 
not with minor/moderate burns, but rather with situations that had potential to be life-
threatening. They perceived use of the hood as increasing the risk of them entering into an 
environment that had potentially life-threatening consequences.  
The second theme unearthed through the analysis was that firefighters saw the hood as 
impacting the skills needed not only to perform the tasks required by their occupation, but also 
those needed to identify dangerous environments. Firefighters perceived the hood to remove 
both their autonomy is such a situation, and hinder the complex mental/physical processes 
needed to perform their duties. By covering the remaining portion of exposed skin on their 
bodies, their ability to control the decision-making process of whether they should remain in 
the environment was perceived as being removed. At the same time, firefighter’s hood was 
also perceived as hindering the complex processes that were used to deduce where a fire was 
located, and continually negotiate if the environment containing this fire exceeded biological 
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limits. This theme – the perceived effects on skill – was at the core of the adverse reactions 
expressed by the firefighters. 
A final, albeit minor, theme found through data analysis was that the hood did have its 
benefits. While it was not perceived as preventing a firefighter enter a life-threatening situation, 
some firefighters did view it as beneficial in intervening during a life-threatening situation. 
Here the hood provided a layer of protection that gave a firefighter a better chance of escaping 
such a situation. Interestingly, this theme was mainly expressed by younger firefighters who 
had little to no experience in the fire service prior to the NFPA 1971 Standard and the hood’s 
mandate. Regardless, it is important to note that even with an overall pervasive negative 
reaction, a perceived benefit of the hood also existed.        
Through recognition that the firefighter’s hood decreased and removed skill that many 
firefighters saw as vital to the tasks required by their occupation, a more robust understanding 
of why firefighters elicited such a reaction to this particular technology is reached. The 
firefighters interviewed were not reacting negatively to the use of the hood itself or the 
authorities mandating it, nor did they view it as a threat to the traditional masculine heroism 
(Ericson & Mellström, 2016). They also provided no indication of disbelieve of past scientific 
research (Prezant et al., 2001a, 2001b) that found the hood to reduce burns received while on 
the fireground. Instead, they were reacting to the removal of the discretionary, mental, physical, 
and interpersonal components that were needed to prevent the placement of themselves and 
others in a situation that presented a heightened risk of major injury or death. In sum, 
underlying this entire adverse reaction was the diminishing or decreasing impact that the 
firefighters hood had on the skill used to successfully complete the tasks required by their 
occupation. 
 It is important to note a few limitations when interpreting the findings of the present 
research. This research was a study of one specific technology, and while it was meant to 
inform those working in the broader field of emergency response, one should be careful not to 
over interpret the results found in these data analyses. Also, the WCFD and RCFD firefighters 
interviewed in this study tended to be the older and more experienced firefighters. Interviewing 
these individuals was vital in understanding how technology has affected the skills of 
firefighters over time, which is why more experienced firefighters were sought out for 
interviews. However, based on the history of resistance to change in fire departments 
(Coleman, 2004), it would appear the firefighters may have been biased towards a negative 
reaction. Although a few less experienced firefighters were interviewed, interviewing a few 
more (particularly those who had not worked until after the hood was mandated) may have 
allowed for an alternative perspective on the reaction to use of the firefighter’s hood. 
 
Implications and Recommendations for Safety Equipment Technology 
 
Despite these limitations, recommendations are able to be made from this research 
study regarding the implementation of new firefighting safety equipment technology. One 
recommendation is that when new technology is introduced to firefighters, a more holistic 
approach should be taken to fully understand its impact and benefits. In the case of the 
firefighter’s hood, rigorous testing was conducted to ensure the hood reduced burns received 
to the neck and head (NFPA 1997; Prezant et al., 2001a, 2001b). None of the firefighters 
interviewed refuted these claims, but instead showed concern over the perceived skill lost by 
being mandated to wear a hood, many viewed as essential to successfully completing the tasks 
required by their occupation. While injury prevention is extremely important in this instance, 
recognizing the effects on occupational skill, performance of required tasks, and firefighters’ 
compliance with standards are aspects that would ideally be considered prior to the widespread 
implementation of a new technology. This would require not only a scientific testing of the 
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physical properties of the safety equipment, but also examination of how the equipment would 
be used by firefighters in real situations, their reaction to its use, and an understanding of why 
this reaction occurs. 
 Firefighters in this study clearly viewed the skills required by their occupation to be 
compromised by the introduction of the firefighter’s hood. A second recommendation would 
be that if the introduction of a specific safety equipment technology was identified by 
firefighters as removing needed skills, alternative skills with the same effectiveness should be 
developed and substituted. For example, the hood was viewed as preventing firefighters from 
negotiating life-threatening situations; therefore, working with these individuals to develop 
alternative methods for negotiating the life-threatening situations created by a fire would help 
prevent this adverse reaction. Realistically, this may be useful for certain technologies, yet 
instances may exist where alternative skills are unable to be developed. In these situations, a 
decision would need to be made as to whether the loss of skill stemming from the introduction 
of new safety equipment technology outweighs the injury prevention-related and other benefits 
of introducing said technology. This would be a difficult decision; one beyond the scope of this 




Through the results of study, I hope to provide insights to the implementation and use 
of new safety technologies among emergency response workers. Negative reactions to safety 
equipment may not necessarily be directed at its ease of use, or at the perceived usefulness of 
this technology itself (Bagozzi, Davis, & Warshaw, 1992; Davis, 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
Instead the underlying reason this negative reaction was spawned was that it was perceived by 
its users as diminishing and/or removing important skills possessed by firefighters. While both 
ease of use and perceived usefulness have been argued as important factors when considering 
the introduction of new technologies, findings here show that it is also important to consider 
the impact a technology will have on workers’ skills. 
These findings also imply the importance of considering both manifest and latent 
consequences of safety equipment technologies introduced to emergency response workers. 
New safety equipment may be introduced with specific consequences in mind; however, its 
introduction can yield unexpected results. Even if these manifest consequences are achieved, 
the unexpected consequences could be concerning. In regards to the firefighter’s hood, past 
researchers found this technology successful in meeting its intended goal of reducing the burns 
firefighters received on the fireground. However, the present study revealed that although 
minor/moderate burns may be reduced, there was the latent consequence of removing important 
skills used by firefighters. This removal was ultimately perceived by firefighters as hindering 
not only their ability to suppress fire, but also increasing the risk of major injury or even death. 
In their view, this latent consequence outweighed the initially intended consequence. Thus, 
attempting to recognize any latent consequences before the implementation of new safety 
equipment may prevent these adverse reactions to such technology. As it may often be difficult 
to foresee consequences, perhaps the consultation of workers for whom this technology will 
affect may provide additional insight. 
As evidenced by the present study, controlled experiments and lab tests may be 
beneficial in testing for the intended the consequences of safety technology; however, the 
perception and experiences of emergency response workers may yield valuable insight into 
latent consequences of the technology’s implementation, such as the diminishment of crucial 
skills needed to perform the tasks required by their occupation. This in turn may help prevent 
any backlash or negative reactions to this technology when it is introduced and its use during 
an emergency is mandated. With new safety equipment technologies continually being 
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introduced, some that have a sole intent of increasing worker safety, a fundamental 
understanding of how these technologies affect workers’ skill remains an important 
consideration. By accounting the safety equipment’s effect on skill, this may not only allow for 
emergency response and other workers to better and more safely perform the tasks required by 
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